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ALFONSO CORTEZ-LARA & MARIA ROSA GARCfAACEVEDO*

The Lining of the All-American Canal:
The Forgotten Voices
ABSTRACT
The unilateraldecision on the part of the United States to line the
All-American Canal is one of the most serious transboundary
groundwater issues facing the United States and Mexico today.
Assuming that U.S. and Mexican aquifers located in the Imperial
and Yuma Valleys in the UnitedStates and the Mexicali Valley in
Mexico are partof the same hydrologicalunit,the liningof the AllAmerican Canal will seriously affect the inflows of groundwater
into the Mexicali Valley. Following a historicalaccount of how
different-andsometimes coexistent-constructionsofwater have
benefited and harmed various groups, this article documents the
forgotten voices of the Mexican users in the Mexicali Valley. Their
answers to survey questions reveal the difficulties they face in
steppingoutside of their historicalcontext-as non-participantsin
the decision-makingprocesses-to effect significant change.
I. INTRODUCTION
The water of the Colorado River was "the most inportant natural
factor" influencing the Cocopaculture of Northern Mexico. This indigenous
population was first to witness the effects of the shared hydrology that
characterizes the Imperial and Mexicali valleys. For this community of
fishers and flood recession farmers, water was a gift of nature. However,
this traditional understanding of water was displaced by new
understandings at the turn of the twentieth century, when water was
constructed as a product that could be delivered through an irrigation
system. At this time, the Cocopa lost "their river" and their traditional
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lifestyle.2 As new populations settled in the Colorado River area, they too
became dependent upon its waters.
This article explores the different constructions of water in the
twentieth century, and how these have impacted the management of water
in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys. Historically, various groups with
diverse interests have sought to benefit by controlling the prevailing
construction of water. Additionally, these constructions have helped some
people and hurt others, such as the Cocopa, that were uninvolved in
collective choices about water. Section II outlines the two dominant
constructions of water in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys in the first half
of the twentieth century, water as product and water as security.
Focusing on the 1980s and 1990s, section III discusses the
predominant construction of water today, water as a commodity. Currently
U.S. markets serve as the conduits for moving water from lower to higher
value uses. Water markets in thirsty southern California cities encourage
projects oriented to save water that can be later transported to urban areas.
In Mexico, the construction of water as a commodity in the 1990s has also
brought about tremendous changes, mainly in terms of the decentralization
of the decision-making processes on water issues and the creation of water
markets.
Section IV addresses the decision to line the All-American Canal
(AAC), which may create a serious water problem along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Lining the AAC, to date, has only been associated with the
management of surface water in the United States. Yet, this project will
seriously diminish the inflows of groundwater in the Mexicali Valley.
Various studies conducted over the years have pointed out that U.S. and
Mexican aquifers located in the Imperial and Yuma valleys in the United
States and the Mexicali Valley in Mexico are part of the same hydrological
unit.3 For example, a piezometric dome was formed in the Yuma Mesa
because of the seepage of irrigation water. Further, the Mexico Ministry of
Hydrology's pioneer geohydrologic study of 1972 states that the Mexicali
Valley aquifer receives an annual recharge of 700 million cubic meters
(Mm3) from the All-American Canal.4
It is our goal in this paper to discuss the impact the lining of the
All-American Canal will have on Mexican users. Specifically, we

2. Anita Alvarez de Williams, Peopleand the River, 39 J.Southwest 354,354 (1997). See
also ANITA ALVAREZ DE WILLIAMS, THE CocoPAH PEOPLE 71 (1974).
3. See Jesds Romtn, El Ada 242: Revestimiento del All-American Canal, in MANEJO
AMBIENTALMENTE ADECUADO DEL AGUA: LA FRONTERA MEmcO-E5TADOS UNIDOS 98 (Jos

Luis Trava et al. eds., 1991).
4. See A.E. Paredes, Aspectos Geohidrol6lgicosdel Distritode Riego 14: Rio Colorado, in
MEMORIAS DEL COLOQUIO SOMRE LA PROBLMATICA DEL AGUA EN USOS AGRICOLAS EN EL
VALLE DE MEXIcAL 28,28-43 (Jesds Roman et al. eds., 1989).
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demonstrate how difficult it has been for Mexican users to step outside of
their historical context and meaningfully participate in the debate over this
issue. In order to capture the point of view of the Mexican users in the
Mexicali Valley, we conducted a survey in the winter of 1998 funded by El
Colegio de la FronteraNorte. Our major findings are discussed at length in
section IV.
II. CONSTRUCTIONS OF WATER IN THE IMPERIAL AND
MEXICALI VALLEYS
The successive and sometimes overlapping meanings of water
traced in this section have greatly affected the management of the shared
hydrologic resources in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys. The bilateral
schemes negotiated under the construction of "water as a product"mainly among entrepreneurs of Mexico and the United States-were
severely questioned when the construction of "water as security" prevailed. Among other consequences, innovative arrangements were formed
with the participation of a new array of agents.
During the last part of the nineteenth century, pioneer explorers
and entrepreneurs saw the vast arid lands in the Imperial and Mexicali
valleys and the adjacent untamed Colorado River as opportunities to create
great wealth. They, however, all conceded that bringing water to the
Imperial Valley from the Colorado River was technically difficult and
prohibitively expensive because of the geography of the land, such as
extensive sand dunes.
Inspired by the construction of water as product, the U.S.-based
California Development Company (CDCO), created in 1896, realized that
the use of water to irrigate the Impeiial Valley required a binational
scheme. The CDCO lent enthusiastic support to the idea of using an
overflow channel of the Colorado River in Mexico, the Alamo Canal, to
irrigate property in the (U.S.) Imperial Valley.' This option saved the
CDCO money and provided a reasonable alternative to building a canal on
U.S. territory.
To facilitate the development of this project, the CDCO first
initiated contacts with Guillermo Andrade, a prominent Mexican official
and businessman who possessed most of the land in the Mexicali Valley,
including the area where the Alamo Canal was located.6 In order to avoid

5. See PH. L. FRADKIN,A RIVER NOMORE: THE COLORADO RIVER ANDTHE WEST 26869 (1981); TRAcEY HENDERSON, IMPERIAL VALLEY 17 (1968); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF
EMPIRE 196-99 (1985).
6. See MARIA-EUGEm ANGUIANO-TULLEZ, AGRICULTURA YMIGRACION EN EL VALLE
DE MEXICALI 38 (1995).
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the restrictions of Mexican law that banned foreigners from having land
close to the border, Andrade and the CDCO founded a Mexican-based
company,
the Sociedad de Irrigaci6ny Terrenosde la Baja Califnia (SITBC) in
7
1898.
This complex web of transnational interests supported the
binational scheme of water distribution, and espoused an open, permeable
U.S.-Mexico border. The close links between the CDCO and the SITBC, and
between the latter and the Colorado River Land Company, explain the
agreement to allocate similar volumes of water to the United States and
Mexico of about 4,478 Mm 3--once the Alamo Canal was in use6
Additionally, the SITBC was allowed to transport 284 cubic meters per
second (m3/s) of water through 45 miles of Mexican territory.9 Such nongovernmental arrangements permitted Mexico to have access to the water
of the Colorado River from the turn of the century until 1942.0
At certain points in time, more than one construction of water has
coexisted. In the early twentieth century, while water was still considered
as a product, the idea of water as security brought about modifications in
its management and distribution in the Imperial and Mexicali Valleys. The
concept of water as security resulted from a series of floods between
1905-1907, which devastated agriculture in the valleys. The United States
classified this natural disaster as a disaster that posed a threat to national
security. Certain "technical" mistakes in the binational irrigation
works-specifically a crudely constructed canal headgate built by the
California Development Company in alluvial lands in Mexico-started the
crisis. President Theodore Roosevelt allocated over three million dollars to
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to win "the battle against the
Colorado" since all previous efforts to tame the river had failed." By early
1907, the first signs of success to control the flow of water materialized.
Yet, the consequences of the 1905-1907 floods marked the end of
the consensus on binational water arrangements. Previously, no one had
seriously criticized the fact that the Imperial Valley canal was built through
Mexico. After the floods, however, the U.S.-based Imperial Valley Water
Users' Association (IVWUA) sought to more strictly define the U.S.-Mexico
border by playing on national security concerns.

7.
8.
9.
10.
(1990).

See id.
See id.
See id.
See JESUS ROMAN CALLERAS, ORIGEN Y DESARROLLO DE DOS AREAS DE RIEGo 11-13

11. See ROBERT GOmFTEB & MARGARET FrIzsIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH. WATER
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 75 (1991); JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY INMEXICAN RELATIONS 462-64 (1967); HENDERSON, supra note

5, at 25.
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The 1VWUA lobbied the U.S. government to establish the Imperial
Irrigation District (IID) in 1911, which eventually covered the entire canal
system, including the irrigation facilities located in Mexico in 1916. With
the strong support of the IVWUA, the U.S. government resurrected the
project of constructing a canal through U.S. territory, a project that was
previously abandoned because of its high cost. In 1928 the AAC was
chosen to irrigate the Imperial Valley, replacing the Alamo Canal, and
water started flowing through the AAC in full force in 1942.12
In this new scenario, from 1942 to 1944 the Mexican and U.S.
governments agreed to share the surface water in the Imperial and Mexicali
valleys (after the non-governmental agreement was no longer in place). In
an era of greater cooperation between Mexico and the United States, the
1944 treaty was signed." With this treaty, Mexico secured an annual
normal quota of 1,850 Mm. 14 The agreement, however, did not address the
quality of water sent to Mexico or the groundwater issue.15
By early 1960, the Mexican government began to conceive of water
as a security issue as well. This was a consequence of the practices of the
Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district in Arizona, which dumped its
agricultural waste waters into the Colorado River for the purpose of
draining the region of all accumulated salinity.16 The water delivered by the
United States to Mexico contained elevated components of salt, which
ruined agricultural land in the Mexicali Valley."'
At first, the U.S. government denied that salinity was a binational
problem. Washington argued that the 1944 treaty related only to water
quantity, not quality, and that Mexico was receiving the amount of water
promised." Further, the United States believed that the damages were due
to Mexico's inadequate technical know-how in dealing with saline waters
and insufficient investment in drainage. 9
As a result of pressure from grassroots movements, the Mexican
government publicly acknowledged the magnitude of the problem in 1962.
At this time President Adolfo L6pez-Mateos declared that the salinity issue
12.

See FRADKIN, supra note 5, at 271, 279.

13. SeeTreaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
14. See id.
15.

See OSCARSANCHEZ-RAMWREZ, CRONICA AGRICOLA DEL VALLE DE MEXICAL 239-42

(1990).
16. See Mgxco Sc.RETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES, LA SALINIDAD DEL RIO
COLORADO 146 (1975).
17. See id. The salt content of river water entering into Mexico rose from about 800
parts per million (ppm) to approximately 2,500 ppm/2,700 ppm, exceeding the standards

for water useful for agriculture. See id.
18.

See id. at 17-19.

19. See id.
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was the greatest diplomatic problem between Mexico and the United
States. In the early 1970s, President Luis Echeverrfa continued to press
Mexico's claims through all available diplomatic channels."
The signing of Minute 242 by the International Boundaries and
Waters Commission (IBWC) in 1973 was the final outcome of the
U.S.-Mexico negotiations on the salinity issue.21 It stipulates the
construction of a desalting plant to treat the water from the WelltonMohawk district, financed by the U.S. federal government, and sets a water
quality standard.'
Minute 242 became a landmark document in terms of
incorporating groundwater into bilateral agreements. Resolution six of
Minute 242 states that Mexico and the United States must consult each
other before stabting any project related to groundwater that could affect
the other party. This provision seeks to prevent future problems related
to all transboundary waters." Additionally, the language used in
Resolution six is a step toward the regulation of groundwater.
Transboundary water expert Albert Utton saw Minute 242 as an important
moment when two nations, working together, accomplished more than
they actually intended, and provided a prime example in the construction
of the international sewage treatment facility at Nogales.'
Groundwater was not mentioned in any bilateral agreements prior
to 1973. The first wells for agricultural uses were drilled in 1925 in the
Mexicali Valley, and from 1960 on, groundwater resources have been
heavily utilized in both the Imperial and Mexicali valleys. Moreover, in
1967, the Dren La Mesa (La Mesa Canal) was built as part of the
infrastructure of Mexico's Irrigation District 014 precisely to regulate the
seepage from the AAC. Currently, the Dren La Mesa taps one m3 /s of
water from the AAC with an average salinity of 900 parts per million
(ppm).26 This canal also receives returned irrigation water from the Mexicali
Valley with an average salinity of 3,500 parts per million (ppm).'

20. See FRADKIN, supra note 5, at 303-08.
21. See Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, Minute No. 242: Permanentand Definitive
Solution to the InternationalProblem of the Salinityof the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 2 (1975).
22. See id. at 2-3, 8. Salinity "should not exceed more than 115 ppm higher or lower

than the water arriving at the Imperial Dam." See M~xxco SEcRETARIA DE R LACIONEs
EXTERIORES, supra note 16, at 155.
23. See Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, supra note 21, at 6.
24. See id.
25. See Albert E. Utton Mexican InternationalWaters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
126,126-27 (Robert E.Beck ed., 1991).
26. SeeCOMISIONNACIONALDELAGUA,EFEcrOsDELREvsTRI

AMERICANO" SOBRE TERrroRlo MEXICANO 2-4 (1991).
27. See id.

M
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Despite its transboundary nature, the increasing mining of
groundwater in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys was ignored by the
Mexican and U.S. governments. In the context of the perception of water
as a security issue, a call for cooperation that could avoid further problems
emerged in Minute 242. Yet, the issue was not followed up until the 1980s
when the context for both surface and groundwater had been totally
modified.
III. WATER AS A COMMODITY IN THE 1980s AND 1990s
During the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s, much credence is
accorded to the idea that water can be managed in a more productive and
efficient manner when constructed as a commodity. The rationale of water
as a commodity focuses on the creation of markets that allow water to flow
toward those willing to bid for it, from lower to higher value uses which
may occur in different geographical jurisdictions, such as in cities rather
than in the countryside. The view of water as a commodity in the Imperial
and Mexicali valleys has permeated the actions of governmental agencies
and fostered societal changes in both the United States and Mexico.
On the U.S. side, turning first to the Imperial Valley, its population
has been increasing since the 1960s (albeit at a slower rate than that of
Mexicali). In 1998, the Imperial Valley's population was 143,400 (see table
1"). The Imperial Valley's Irrigation District (ID), with 458,900 acres of net
area irrigated,' is still considered a key agricultural area in the United
States. Yet only a small percentage of the population worked in agriculture
(less than one percent)."

28. See CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1958, 1999); INSTmTUTo NACIONALDE
ESTADISTICA, GEOGRAFIA E INFORMATICA, (1998); XI CENSO GENERAL DE POBLACKON Y
VIVIENDA 37-39 (1998); CONEPO, BAJA CALIFORNIA, PROYECCIONES DE POBLACION 28-49
(1999); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTIcS (1970,1980).
29. See IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., PROFILE OF THE IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT
(1997). In 1988, the net irrigatedarea comprised 489,112 acres. See id.

30. See Scott Whiteford &Alfonso Cortez-Lara, Cmflictos Urbano-RuralesSobreel Agua
del Rio Coloradoen el Ambito Internacional,in AGUA: DESAFIOS Y OPORTUNIDADES PARA EL
SIGLo XXI 121,121-153 (Gobiemo del Estado de Aguascalientes, 1996).
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TABLE 1: POPULATION GROWTH IN THE BORDER AREA,
BAJA CALIFORNIA-CALIFORNIA 1930-1999

YEAR
1930
1940
1950

SAN DIEGO
209,659
289,348
556,808

TIJUANA
11,000
22,000
65,000

IMPERIAL
60,903
59,740
62,975

MEXICALI
29,985
44,399
124,362

1960

1,033,011

166,000

72,105

281,333

1970

1,270,735

341,000

74,492

396,324

1980
1990

1,861,846
2,511,400

462,000
747,000

92,110
110,800

510,664
601,938

1995*
1999*
(*estimates)

2,669,200
2,828,300

1,035,415
1,218,309

137,400
143,400

695,805
764,396

Urban pressure for the water of the Imperial Valley has come from
its neighbor, the nearby San Diego County. Currently, the IID and the San
Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) are partners in what promises
to be the largest rural to urban water sale in U.S. history. The lID decided
to sell part of the 3.3 acre-feet annual allocation of Colorado River water
rights it holds to the SDCWA, lured by the possibility of gaining substantial
revenue from this water deal. 1 An agreement was signed in April 1998.32
If fully implemented, the water would be transferred to SDCWA for 45
years.' In the first year of the agreement 24,669,780 3 will be delivered.'
The amount of water will increase every year up to a maximum of
246,669,780 n3 per year.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) has described the IIDSDCWA agreement as a commendable model for intrastate transfers of the
sort that could "solve" the problem of increasing demand for water in
urban California. U.S. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt stated that he
would probably bow to pressure from those requesting that more water be
sent to Colorado, Nevada, and Arizona (U.S. states that would also have
received water from the Colorado River), and less to California, if the

31. See San Diego County Water Auth., Landmark Water Conservation and Transfer
Agreement Ratified (Press Release
Apr.
29,1998)
<http://www.sdcwa.org/text/pressrel/iidvote2.htm>.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Seeid.
35. See id.
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transfer agreement between the HD and SDCWA falls apart.3 California
may also play a more active role in facilitating the transfer by pledging
$200 million from a prospective $1 billion water bond issue to bridge the
gap between the contending parties.
The IID-SDCWA water will most certainly usher in a new era of
water marketing and commodification throughout the Colorado River
basin. It exemplifies the acceptance that water markets facilitate a list of
positive consequences, including more programs to conserve water and
economy-boosting revenue gained by water-selling rural communities.
Among the priority programs oriented to optimize water conservation and
management in the Imperial Valley is the lining of the major surface water
canals, including the AAC. 8
On the Mexican side the construction of water as a commodity has
brought an array of new challenges to agricultural water users in the
Mexicali Valley. The context that surrounds their daily life has been
modified in a rather abrupt manner, beginning in the early 1990s. Water
has been increasingly diverted to growing urban areas. In 1995, from a
population of 695,805 in the Mexicali County, 72.6 percent of all inhabitants
resided in urban areas. (See table 1.) The demographic trends suggest a
continuing urban population growth of 2.6 percent between 1990 and
1995.-' For example, in the 1980s the city of Mexicali consumed about eight
percent of the total demand of water for the valley; the demand rose to 15
percent in the 1990s. As the urban consumers expand their needs, the
competition for water increases.40
Moreover, major changes occurred in Mexican legislation on water
issues. These modifications included the decentralization of the decisionmaking processes in water matters and the eventual creation of water
markets in Mexico. The reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution,
and the passing of the Ley de Aguas Nacionales, the National Waters Act
(LAN), in 1992, dramatically altered the role of the Mexican state as the

36. See Cal. State Office of Resources, Water Resources Overview (visited January 11,
2000) <http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/natural/waterjuly99.htm>.

37. See Ted Rohrlich, Thirst to Overhaul Powerful Water Agency Grows Stronger,L.A.
TIMES, July 19,1998, at B1.
38. See Tony Perry, Agencies DisputeRoils Southland Waters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,1997,
at A3; San Diego County Water Auth., San Diego ImperialValley WaterTransfer Would Benefit
California, Chairwoman Says (Press Release Mar. 18, 1997) <http://www.sdcwa.org/
text/pressrel/frahmild.htm>.
39.

See GOBIERNO DEL ESTADO DE BAJA CAL, BAJA CALIFORNIA: PROYECClONES DE

PoBLACION POR LocAuDAD 1999 28-49 (1999).
40. SeeFrancisco Bernal-RodriguezAndlisisde las Eficienciasen el UsoyManejodel Agua
de Riego en el Vale de Mexicali, in MANEJO AMBIENTALMENTE ADECUADO DEL AGUA: LA
FRONTUA M9xICO-EsrADoS UNIDXS 228,228-237 (Josd Luis Trava-Manzanilla et aL eds.,

1991).
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ultimate owner of water in Mexico. 1 The LAN substantially modified the
role of the Comisi6n Nacionaldel Agua (CNA) as a regulatory agency. The
LAN also included a schedule to transfer water rights from the formerly
government-controlled irrigation districts to the non-governmental water
users' associations, which were constituted among farmers residing in the
m6dulos de riego (the subdivisions of the irrigation district). Additionally,
the LAN granted the CNA supervisory authority over this process.
Moreover, LAN modified the longstanding link between land and water
established by Article 27 of Mexico's Constitution of 1917. The LAN
transferred the management of water into the hands of the states of the
Mexican federation and the individual users, and allowed for water to be
sold or purchased independently of the possession of land and for water
markets to be created.'
Upon the transfer of water rights to the water users' associations,
the federal government steps aside. Thus, the management of water,
including maintenance costs, irrigation systems, new infrastructure, water
distribution, and the solution of conflicts that may arise become the
responsibility of the asociaci6n de usuarios (users' association) of each
m6duto. In the Mexicali Valley there are currently 22 m6dulos.
The LAN was passed in Mexico without consulting rural
communities that would be affected, including those in the Mexicali Valley.
Cortez-Lara reports that in 1992, fifty-seven percent of the rural dwellers
were opposed to any modification of the Mexican Constitution on water
issues. Most of them were afraid that their m6dulo could not afford the
maintenance of the infrastructure, nor could they conduct further public
works. Others had doubts about the democratic procedures within the
newly-created asociacionesde usuarios.
Yet, in 1998, six years later, another survey indicated that the
number of people opposed to the new arrangements had decreased by 26
percent.' Interestingly, this survey reported that the red tape that
& " This change
characterized the bureaucracy of the CNA had diminished.

41. See E. Palacio-Wez, Marco Legal Institucionalpara la Gesti6n Eficiente del Agua: El
Caso de Aguascalientes, in AGUA: DEsAFIOSY OPORTUNIDADES PARA EL SIGLO XXI, supra note
29, at 212, 212-214 (1996).

42. See Alfonso Cortez-Lara, La Autogesti6n de Usuarios Hidroagricolasdel Valle de
Mexicali:Efecto del Procesode Transferencia,I I REVisA ESTuDIos FRoNER7_os (forthcoming
2000).
43. See EL COLEGIO DE LA FRONTERA NORTE-MExIcALI, PRELIMINARY STUDY ON THE
EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION, ENVIRONMENTANDSOCIBTY OFTHE LINING OFTHE ALL-AMERIcAN
CANAL 8, 8-10 (1998).
44. See id. at 10-11.
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was considered a positive development. However, opinions within each of
the m6dulos varied substantially.'
In summation, the construction of water as a commodity has been
strengthened in both the United States and Mexico. In the United States, the
rural areas that engage in less profitable uses of water will lose out to urban
areas where industrial and residential water users are able to pay more.
Meanwhile, the management of water in Mexico has changed.
Decentralization of the decision-making process, democracy "from above,"
and water markets have been imposed on the users of water throughout
the country, including those in the Mexicali Valley.
IV. THE LINING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: THE
FORGOTTEN VOICES IN MEXICO
The decision to line the All-American Canal is linked with
California's "4.4 Plan," which is designed to keep water usage from the
Colorado River at a maximum of 4.4 million acre-feet per year.* This plan
includes the "lingof the All-American Canal as well as the nearby
Coachella Canal. The main goal of this plan is to prevent seepage into the
groundwater aquifer, which has been approximately 83.5 Mm3 per year.w
Upon recommendation of the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S.
Congress passed a law "to provide 135 million for the lining of these
canals."' 9 Unfortunately, the AAC would substantially alter the ecosystem
and bring about serious environmental and societal destruction in the
Mexican "area of influence."' This area comprises about 19,200 hectares,
located around the Mesa de Andrade in the Northeast part of the Mexicali
Valley.51
Numerous species of vegetation and animals, which adapted to
this area of influence immediately after the construction of the AAC and
the La Mesa Canal, are in peril if the lining of the AAC is carried out.

45. See Cortez-Lara, supra note 42, at 10.
46. See Cal. State Office of Resources, Water Resources Overview, (visited January 11,
2000) <www.sen.ca.gov/sor/natural/Wateruly99 htm>.
47. See id.
48. See U.S. DEP'TOFTHE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTSTATEMENT/FNALENVIRONMENTALIMPAcTREPORT: ALL-AMERICAN CANALLINING
PROJECT I-I to 1-2, 11-1 to 1-10 (1994).
49. ld. at 11I-2 to II-11.
50. See Julio Alfonso Navarro-Urbina, Impacto del Revestimiento del Canal Todo
Americano en el Distrito de Riego 014, Rio Colorado, Baja California y Sonora 24-25 (April,
1998) (unpublished masters thesisUniversidad Aut6noma delBaja California (Tijuana)) (on
file with author).

51. See id.
52. See COMISION NACIONAL DEL AGUA, supra note 26, at 9-11.
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Endangered vegetation includes galleta,gobernadora,mezquite, canutilloand
other wetlands plants.' In addition, the habitat for animals, such as quail,
sparrow hawks, doves, coyotes, hares, lizards, rattlesnakes, and insects,
would also be seriously altered. s
Profound agricultural effects will also be felt Detrimental
consequences could be expected in subdivisions (m6dulos de riego)'
numbers four, five, six, seven, and thirteen of Mexico's irrigation district
number 014 of the Rio Colorado. Major losses in prime agricultural lands
that comprise an area consisting of over 1,200 hectares would occur
because the lining of the AAC would alter the entire irrigation system for
the Valley. Table 2 indicates the major crops cultivated in these areas are
wheat, cotton, alfalfa, asparagus, and chive, all of which would be
negatively affected by the lining of the AAC.
TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM IN
THE "AREA OF INFLUENCE" OF THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL
PERCENT OF USERS
IRRIGATION SYSTEM
27%
Surface only
60%
Wells only
13%
Both
MOST IMPORTANT CROPS
MEAN
TYPE OF AREA
1. Wheat, cotton and alfalfa
With rights to irrigate 20 hectares
2. Asparagus, chives, and other
30 hectares
Irrigated
vegetables.

As table 2 shows, 60 percent of the users depend more on
groundwater than on surface water for irrigation. Only 27 percent of the
users, irrigating approximately 278 hectares, depend on surface water. In
the agricultural year 1995-1996, a volume of 255.12 Mm3 from groundwater
(collected through 158 wells) was used to irrigate 16,558 hectares. The
salinity of the water from these wells was around 1,873 ppm. In
approximately 33 wells the concentration was larger than 2,000 ppm.
Without the seeping water from the AAC to dilute the more saline water
from the aquifer, the quality of irrigation water mined from wells would
be poor.
In addition, with the lining of the AAC, the volume of water
currently obtained from the La Mesa Canal would dry up. Certainly, this

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Each m6dulo has an average surface of 8,000 hectares (20,000 acres).
56. See EL COLEGIO DE LA FRONTERA NoRTF-MEXcAu, supra note 43, at 12.
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canal would continue receiving flows of water from other sources besides
the AAC, but these flows would have a higher content of salt. Further
studies need to be conducted into the impact of saline water flows in
agriculture. The antecedent of the 1960s, in which saltier water ruined
good-quality agricultural lands in the Mexicali Valley, supports the
conclusion that the future of Mexican agriculture looks rather grim.'
Undoubtedly, the societal effects of the lining of the AAC would
be greatly felt in thirty Mexican towns, each with a population of at least
one thousand. Affected towns include Ciudad Morelos (pop. 7,913); Benito
JuArez (pop. 4,609); Vicente Guerrero (Los Algodones) (pop 4,374); and
Paredones (pop. 3,870).' Despite this, the voices of Mexican users have not
been heard in the debate over the lining of the AAC. As stated earlier, from
the beginning the project was framed as a U.S. unilateral issue, the saving
of water for urban uses. The possibility of incorporating the opinions of
Mexican users in the Mexicali Valley in the decision making process was
simply not a consideration.
With the support of El Colegio de la FronteraNorte, the authors
conducted a pilot survey (Cdula de Informacidn General Ticnica sobre el
Impacto del Revestimiento del Canal Todo Americano en la Zona Colindantecon
el Valle de Mexicali) in the winter of 1998. Our aim was to document the
voices of the Mexican water users. Fifty-five water users from the m6dulos
de riego numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 13 of Irrigation District number 014 of the
Colorado River, including the leaders of the users' associations of these
m6dulos, were interviewed. All respondents, except for these leaders, were
selected at random.
This survey is part of a more comprehensive study on the
economic, environmental, and societal effects the lining of the AAC will
have on Mexico. Our main purpose is to collect data describing (a) the
information that users possess about the importance of the groundwater
aquifer and the Dren La Mesa as sources of irrigation water in the Mexicali
Valley; (b) Mexican water users' knowledge regarding the project of lining
of the AAC; (c) Mexican users' perceptions about the impact of the lining
of the AAC on economic and environmental issues in the Mexicali Valley;
(d) their opinions on the Mexican government' actions and the users'
associations vis-A-vis the lining project; and (e) their own sense of political
efficacy, specifically whether or not they feel empowered enough to alter

57. In 1995, Mexico's National Water Commission conducted a study on soils to
determine their degree of salinity in the area considered under the influence of the AAC.
See COMISION NACIONALIDELAGUA, supra note 26. According to the study, conducted in an
area of 13,121 hectares, 71.8% of the soil was considered of premium quality (0-4E.C. and
0-15 ISA). See id. at 40-41.
58. See GOBIERNO DEL ESTADO DE BAJA CAL., supra note 39, at 23-48.
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the impact of the lining project on themselves. The answers of the
respondents follow.
Asked about their main sources of irrigation water, 67 percent of
the respondents stated that their total supply of water came from wells that
receive water from the aquifer. This figure coincides with expert opinion
about the critical role of groundwater use in the Mexicali Valley.-" In
addition, 40 percent of the interviewees obtain supplementary irrigation
water from the Dren La Mesa, which collects the seepage from the AAC. As
table 3 indicates, only 33 percent of the users do not use water sources
connected to groundwater.
TABLE 3. WHICH BENEFITS DO YOU OBTAIN FROM THE DREN
LA MESA AND THE GROUNDWATER AQUIFER?
BENEFITS
PERCENT OF
USERS
Total supply of irrigation water from
67%
wells/groundwater aquifer
Supplementary irrigation water from the Dren La
40%
Mesa
Do not use directly/None of the above
33%
Concerning the information that the users possess about the lining
of the AAC, 94 percent of the respondents stated that they know about the
project, although 27 percent of them admitted that they only know "a little"
about the project. Meanwhile, six percent of the interviewees stated that
they do not know anything about this project (see table 4).
TABLE 4: DO YOU KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE LINING
OF THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL?
ALITTLE
NO
I YES
[ANSWER
PERCENT OF USERS
1 67%
6%
27%
These sources of information shed light on just how well informed
the respondents are. According to table 5, fifty percent of the respondents
obtain their information through the media. The problem with this source
is that it may not convey the whole picture, and, therefore, could conceal
the real impact of the lining of the AAC. The percentage of informants who
receive information directly from governmental officials is very low. Only
seven percent of the respondents have had access to this type of
information. The number of respondents, 43 percent, that obtained

59. See EL COLEGIO DE LA FRONTERA NoRTE-MExxcAu, supra note 43, at 17.
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information from informal comments is intriguing. It may indicate that
users have a non-institutional network that is used to disseminate
information.
TABLE 5: HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE LINING OF THE
ALL-AMERICAN CANAL?
MEDIA
50%

MEETING WITH
OFFICIALS
7%

INFORMAL COMMENTS
43%

More than 80 percent of the respondents agree with certain experts'
reports about the negative consequences that the lining project may cause
in the area of influence of the AAC in Mexico. Among the effects that users
mentioned are less income (86 percent), less production of crops (86
percent), and higher cost of agricultural production (90 percent). Asked
specifically to calculate the magnitude of the negative effects perceived, 29
percent of the users concerned about less income estimate a loss of up to 35
percent of their income. Among the users preoccupied by less crop yields,
42 percent of them reported a possible negative impact of 39 percent.
Finally, 50 percent of the users who stated the increased cost of production
as an effect of the lining project cited a 36 percent increase in their costs of
production if the project materializes (see table 6).
TABLE 6: WHAT KIND OF EFFECTS WOULD THE LINING OF THE
ALL-AMERICAN CANAL BRING TO THIS AREA?
PERCENT
MAGNITUDE
PERCENT
EFFECTS
OF USERS
OF USERS
29%
35%
86%
Less income
42%
39%
86%
Less crops yields
50%
36%
90%
Increased cost of production
According to the respondents, specific aspects of the environment
would be affected the most. Among the interviewees, 79 percent cited the
deterioration of the quality of groundwater and surface water as their
worst fear, followed by contamination of soil (50 percent), and negative
effects on animals and vegetation (43 percent) whose cycle of life has been
related to the seeping canal water. In addition, 26 percent of the
respondents foresee the advent of more than one of the stated negative
consequences (see table 7).
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TABLE 7: WHICH ASPECT OF THE ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE THE MOST
PROFOUNDLY IMPACTED BY THE LINING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
CANAL?
MORE
SOIL
GROUND
VEGETATION ANIMALS
ASPECT
THAN
WATER
ONE OF
&
THESE
SURFACE
WATER

PERCENT
OF
USERS

43%

43%

79%

ASPECTS

50%

50%

Next, the survey asked the respondents to identify the effects of
lining the AAC on towns located in the northern part of the Mexicali Valley
(see table 8). In their answers, 60 percent of the interviewees expressed their
concern with the diminishing of the potable water supply, 20 percent with
deforestation or limited forestation, and 13 percent with less employment.
Furthermore, 26 percent of the respondents foresaw at least two negative
effects.
TABLE 8: HOW WOULD THE LINING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
CANAL AFFECT THE TOWNS LOCATED IN THE NORTHEAST
PART OF THE MEXICALI VALLEY?

TYPE OF EFFECT
Lessen supply of potable water
Deforestation or limited forestation

PERCENT OF USERS
60%
20%

Less employment

13%

More than one of the previous effects

26%

Respondents also stated their opinions about the role of the
Mexican government. According to 89 percent of the interviewees, the
participation of the Mexican government was considered to be "low to
average" (see table 9). Only eight percent perceive the government to be
highly involved with this issue. Note that this percentage is almost
identical to the percentage of people who previously reported that they
obtained their information about the effects of the lining of the AAC from
the government.
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TABLE 9: HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT'S PARTICIPATION ON THIS ISSUE, THE
LINING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL?
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

PERCENT OF
USERS

8%
13%
66%
13%

High
Average
Low
Did not respond

Results regarding the users' associations' role in the AAC lining
issue are mixed. Forty-three percent of the interviewees stated that their
user association plays an "active" role, mainly through the construction of
irrigation works that could palliate the crisis that the lining project may
create. Yet, 57 percent of respondents perceive that the associations have
had a rather passive role in preventing, mitigating, or solving the problem,
as table 10 illustrates. In the eyes of the users, the associations seem to have
failed in their task of disseminating information to their members and
networking with governmental agencies (mainly with the CNA). If the
users' associations have played any role in these tasks, the users are not
aware of it.
TABLE 10. WHICH ATTITUDES ARE HELD BY AND/OR ACTIONS
ARE CONDUCTED BY THE ASSOCIATIONS OF USERS AND/OR
THE SOCIETY OF THE IRRIGATION DISTRICT?
PERCENT
OF USERS

ATTITUDES:
PERCENT OF
USERS

ACTIONS

Passive

None
Meetings to disseminate
information
Build new irrigation works (i.e.

64%

canals) as preventive measure

21%

Active

57%
43%

7%

Ask the Comisi6n Nacionaldel
Agua to address the issue

8%

The survey points out that the users are very aware of the dangers
that the lining of the AAC would bring and they do not feel that the
government or their associations are reacting accordingly (see table 11).
Yet, they seem to have a low sense of political efficacy; as individuals they
do not feel influential enough to take action. Forty-three percent of the
respondents do not consider themselves able to do anything. Another 21
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percent openly recognize that any type of solution requires the
participation of the CNA and the IBWC. So far, only seven percent of the
interviewees are willing to engage themselves in some kind of protest.
In summation, in the context of water as a commodity, agricultural
users in the Mexicali Valley gained the right to manage water
infrastructure in each of the subdivisions of the irrigation district-the
m6dulos. Users, however, are not powerful enough to take further action
when their interests are in danger. Yet, the survey reported that they have
a clear picture of the kinds of problems they would encounter with the
lining of the AAC.
TABLE 11. AS AN INDIVIDUAL, WHAT ARE YOU DOING
REGARDING THIS PROBLEM?
TYPE OF ACTION
PERCENT OF
USERS

Protest and demand the cancellation of the lining
of the AAC
Acknowledge that any solution needs to emerge
from Mexican governmental institutions--the

7%
21%

Comisi6n Nacionaldel Agua or the Comision
Internacionalde Limites y Aguas

Search for information
Nothing
Improve the use and management of water

7%
43%
22%

V. CONCLUSION
The Cocopa were wise enough to understand that the Imperial and
Mexicali Valleys were part of the same hydrological area. The successive
and sometimes overlapping meanings of water traced in this article have
not always accepted this fact. They have oscillated in supporting binational
schemes or unilateral solutions in the management of surface water and
groundwater in the valleys.
When surface water was constructed as a product at the turn of the
century, the convenience of using Mexican territory to send water to the
Imperial Valley fostered a commitment to a binational scheme. Water as
security brought mixed consequences. In the first decade of the century,
U.S. criticism was directed at sharing "its water" with Mexico. Whereas in
the early 1970s, the salinity crisis in the Mexicali Valley created support for
a bilateral solution that addressed the allocation of surface waters of a
particular standard of quality for both the United States and Mexico.
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The mining of groundwater was at first ignored as a "problem"
and was not thought of as a subject needing regulation. However, its fate
was linked to surface water in the 1970s during the bilateral negotiations
after the salinity crisis. Minute 242, which sealed the 1973 agreement
between Mexico and the United States, included the seeds for a future
formal agreement on groundwater. Both governments were committed to
holding further consultations before making any decisions related to
groundwater.
Currently, the construction of water as a commodity dominates
discourse in Mexico and the United States in the 1990s. This construction
empowers some while disadvantaging others in both countries. Justified
by the logic of the market, the construction exacerbates the cleavages
between the urban and the rural interests, and the rich and the poor in both
countries. The dominant discourse on water has limited the possibilities of
a common view on sharing water resources. So far, the contemporary
debate concerning the lining of the AAC has not been framed in a bilateral
scheme. As Jones, Duncan, and Mumme state, the U.S. consultation with
Mexico has been "limited."' ° In this scenario, the voices of the Mexican
users are even more remote, and less likely to be heard.
Yet, our survey illustrates that the water users in the Mexicali
Valley are certainly aware of the negative consequences in their day-to-day
lives of the decisions taken beyond the confines of their country. They do
not hesitate in criticizing the Mexican government and their top-bottom
created organizations, because of what they perceive as their inertia vis-hvis the impact of the lining of the AAC. The users certainly have
grievances, although their concerns have not translated into actions so far.
The answer to this may be in the difficulty of stepping outside the narrow
confines imposed upon them. But this situation can change, as evidenced
by the salinity crisis, in which the initial inaction of the Mexican users was
followed by civil activism that was able to have an impact in governmental
actions.

60. Lilias C. Jones et al., Assesssing Transboundary Environmental Impacts on the

U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-CanadianBorders,J. BORDERLANDs STUD., Spring & Fall 1997, at 73,
81.

